Abstract-With increasing popularity of location-based services (LBSs), there have also been growing concerns for location privacy. To protect location privacy in an LBS, mobile users in physical proximity can work in concert to collectively change their pseudonyms, in order to hide spatial-temporal correlation in their location traces. In this paper, we leverage mobile users' social tie structure to motivate them to participate in pseudonym change. Drawing on a social group utility maximization framework, we cast users' decision making of whether to change pseudonyms as a socially aware pseudonym change game (SA-PCG). The SA-PCG further assumes a general anonymity model that allows a user to have its specific anonymity set for personalized location privacy. For the SA-PCG, we show that there exists a socially aware Nash equilibrium (SNE), and quantify the system efficiency of SNEs with respect to the optimal social welfare. Then, we develop a greedy algorithm that myopically determines users' strategies, based on the social group utility derived from only the users whose strategies have already been determined. We show that this algorithm efficiently finds an SNE that enjoys desirable properties: 1) it is socially aware coalition-proof, and thus is also Pareto-optimal; 2) it achieves higher social welfare than any SNE for the socially oblivious pseudonym change game. We further quantify the system efficiency of this SNE with respect to the optimal social welfare. We also show that this SNE can be achieved in a distributed manner. Numerical results using real data corroborate that social welfare can be significantly improved by exploiting social ties.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE proliferation of mobile devices is predicted to continue in the foreseeable future. In 2014, mobile phone shipments are projected to reach 1.9 billion units, about 7 times that of desktop and laptop combined [2] . With rapid growth of mobile networks, location-based services (LBS) have become increasingly popular recently (e.g., location-based navigation and recommendation). However, the providers of LBSs are often considered not trustworthy, due to the risk of leaking users' location information to other parties (e.g., sell users' location data). As a result, mobile users are exposed to potential privacy threats when using a LBS. Although a user can use a pseudonym for the LBS, an adversary can infer the user's real identity from its location traces (e.g., from the user's home and work addresses). To protect location privacy, an effective approach is to "confuse" the adversary using the notion of anonymity [3] : mobile users in physical proximity can change their pseudonyms simultaneously to form an anonymity set, so that the adversary cannot distinguish any of them from the others.
Clearly, as mobile devices are carried and operated by human beings, pseudonym change hinges heavily on human behavior. In particular, altruistic behaviors are widely observed among people with social ties. 1 It is then natural to ask "Is it possible to leverage social ties for pseudonym change to enhance location privacy?" The past few years have witnessed explosive growth of online social networks. In 2013, the number of online social network users worldwide has crossed 1.73 billion, nearly one quarter of the world's population [4] . As a result, social relationships influence people's interactions with each other in an unprecedented manner. This motivates us to exploit social ties among users for pseudonym change to improve their location privacy. Since pseudonym change typically incurs considerable overhead (e.g., service interruption, resource consumption [5] ), users need strong incentives (e.g., adequate privacy gain) to participate in pseudonym change. We caution that secure protocols are needed to hide users' real identities when social information is used (will be elaborated further in Section IV-E).
A basic assumption commonly used in existing studies [5] - [7] is that all users participating in pseudonym Illustration of the social group utility maximization (SGUM) framework: a mobile network can be viewed as a virtual social network underlying a physical communication network. Mobile users have diverse social ties in the social domain, while mobile devices have diverse physical relationships in the physical domain.
change have the same anonymity set. 2 However, from an individual user's perspective, the set of users that can obfuscate its pseudonym (i.e., its anonymity set) can be different from that of another user, depending on users' physical locations. For example, a user with a higher privacy sensitivity would have a smaller anonymity set compared to others. It is thus desirable to meet users' needs for personalized location privacy. To this end, we consider a general anonymity model where a user can specify its anonymity set which is different from others'. The anonymity set can be determined by the user defining its anonymity range such that the users within the anonymity range form the anonymity set. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , user 1 and 2 are out of user 3's anonymity range and thus are not in user 3's anonymity set (indicated by no directed edge from user 1 or 2 to user 3 in the physical graph); user 1 and 3 are within user 2's anonymity range and thus are in user 2's anonymity set (represented by the directed edges from user 1 and 3 to user 2 in the physical graph).
In this paper, we leverage mobile users' social tie structure to motivate them to participate in pseudonym change. Drawing on a social group utility maximization (SGUM) framework recently developed in [8] , we cast users' decision making of whether to participate in pseudonym change as a sociallyaware pseudonym change game (SA-PCG). The SGUM framework captures the impact of users' diverse social ties on the interactions of their mobile devices subject to diverse physical relationships (as illustrated in Fig. 1 ). The PCG is based on a general anonymity model that allows each user to have its specific anonymity set. In the SA-PCG, each user aims to maximize its social group utility, defined as the sum of its individual utility and the weighted sum of its social friends' individual utilities. For the SA-PCG, we are interested in answering the following important questions: Does the game admit a socially-aware Nash equilibrium (SNE)? What is the system efficiency of SNEs? How can we efficiently find an SNE with desirable properties?
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. 2 Note that users can still have different valuations of location privacy in these studies [5] - [7] . Fig. 2 . Illustration of the general anonymity model: Each user specifies its anonymity set for personalized location privacy by defining an anonymity range, e.g., a disk centered at the user's location (represented by the dashed circles).
• We propose a framework where mobile users' social tie structure is leveraged to motivate them to participate in pseudonym change, based on a general anonymity model that allows each user to have its specific anonymity set for personalized location privacy. Taking a social group utility approach, we cast users' decision making of whether to change pseudonyms as a pseudonym change game.
• For the SA-PCG, we first show that there always exists a socially-aware Nash equilibrium. Then we quantify the system efficiency of the SNE by bounding the gap between the optimal social welfare and the social welfare of the "best" SNE, which is the SNE that achieves the maximum social welfare among all SNEs. We observe that the best SNE is difficult to compute in general, and the often used best response updates would find an SNE with lower social welfare. Then we develop a greedy algorithm that myopically determines users' strategies, based on the social group utility derived from only the users whose strategies have already been determined. We first show that the algorithm can efficiently find an SNE that is socially-aware coalition proof, and thus is also Pareto-optimal. We then show that the SNE's social welfare is no lower than that of the best SNE for the sociallyoblivious PCG. Next we show that the social welfare of the SNE increases when social ties increase, and its performance gap with respect to the optimal social welfare is bounded above. We further show that the Pareto-optimal SNE can be achieved in a distributed manner.
• We evaluate the performance of the SNE by extensive simulation results for Erdos-Renyi model and real dataset based social networks. We demonstrate the impact of various parameters on system efficiency, individual users' performance, and computational complexity of the proposed algorithm. Numerical results corroborate that social welfare can be significantly improved by exploiting social ties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work are reviewed in Section II. In Section III, we formulate the socially-aware pseudonym change game (SA-PCG) based on a general anonymity model for personalized location privacy, under the social group utility maximization framework. Section IV focuses on the analysis of the SA-PCG. Numerical results are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
With growing concerns for location privacy arising from pervasive mobile communication and computing, a great deal of research have been done to protect mobile users' location privacy. This work falls in the category of anonymity-based approaches [3] , [5] - [7] , [9] . Earlier studies [3] , [10] show that an adversary can infer the real identity of a mobile user by analyzing the spatial-temporal correlation of its location traces. To overcome this vulnerability, pseudonyms should not only be changed over time but also be obfuscated across space to prevent inference attacks. Inspired by the notion of k-anonymity, Beresford and Stajano [3] introduced the notion of mix zone. By changing pseudonyms within a mix zone, users can make their new pseudonyms undistinguishable to the adversary. While the mix zone model assumes that all users have the same anonymity set, the general anonymity model proposed in this paper allows each user to define its specific anonymity set different from others'. A few work have studied users' interactions in pseudonym change based on gametheoretic models. The mix zone based pseudonym change has been studied in [5] as a non-cooperative game with complete or incomplete information. Auction-based mechanisms have been designed in [7] to incentive users to participate in pseudonym change. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first to exploit social relationships to improve location privacy by pseudonym change.
There have been much work on incentive design for stimulating user cooperation in networks. Most of the existing approaches are based on (virtual) currency [11] - [14] , in which a user earns currency by providing cooperation to others and spends currency to receive cooperation from others. However, a major drawback of using currency is that it relies on a centralized authority (e.g., a bank) and typically incurs a high implementation overhead, due to the need to inhibit malicious manipulation of the currency among users without mutual trust. Therefore, it is appealing to motivate users to cooperate without using currency.
The social aspect of mobile networking is an emerging paradigm for network design and optimization [15] . Social contact patterns have been exploited for efficient data forwarding and dissemination in delay tolerant networks [16] , [17] . Social trust and social reciprocity have been leveraged in [18] to enhance cooperative D2D communication based on a coalitional game. Recently, a social group utility maximization (SGUM) framework is developed in [19] , [8] , and [20] , which captures the impact of users' diverse social ties on the interactions of their devices subject to diverse physical coupling. A primary merit of this framework is that it provides rich modeling flexibility and spans the continuum between non-cooperative game and network utility maximization, two traditionally disjoint paradigms for network optimization.
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Privacy Threat in Location-Based Services
We consider a mobile network where users obtain their locations via mobile devices that are capable of localization (e.g., by GPS or wireless access points based localization).
Users send their locations to a LBS provider for a certain LBS (e.g., location-based navigation or recommendation), and the LBS provider feedbacks the desired results to the users based on their reported locations. To protect privacy, each user uses a pseudonym as its identity for the LBS.
As in [3] , [7] , and [9] , we assume that the LBS provider is untrusted, i.e., it may leak users' location traces to an adversary. For example, the adversary may steal the location data by hacking into the LBS system. The adversary aims to learn the real identity of a user by analyzing the locations visited by the user's pseudonym. We also assume that users are honest-but-curious in the sense that each user honestly follows the protocols with others (will be discussed in Section IV-E), but is curious about others' private information. We further assume that the adversary may collude with a limited number of users to gain useful information for inferring a user's real identity.
The use of pseudonym allows short-term reference to a user (e.g., one pseudonym can be used for the navigation of an entire trip between two locations), which is useful for many LBSs and does not disclose private information. However, long-term linking among a user's locations should be prevented, as it may reveal sufficient information for inferring the user's real identity [10] , [21] , [22] . Although a user may hide explicit linking among its locations by changing its pseudonym, the adversary can still link different pseudonyms of the user by exploiting the spatial-temporal correlation of its locations. For example, consider a user that visits location l 1 with pseudonym Alice at time t 1 , and then visits location l 2 which is close to location l 1 with pseudonym Bob at time t 2 . If the adversary observes from the location traces that no other user changes its pseudonym between time t 1 and t 2 , or there exists such a user but it does not visit any location close to location l 1 or l 2 , then the adversary can infer that pseudonym Alice and Bob must refer to the same user, since only the same user can visit both location l 1 and l 2 within the limited period between time t 1 and t 2 .
B. Pseudonym Change for Personalized Location Privacy
To protect location privacy from inference attacks, an effective approach is based on the notion of anonymity: users in physical proximity can carry out their pseudonym changes simultaneously [3] , so that the adversary cannot link their pseudonyms before the changes to their respective pseudonyms after the changes. A popular pseudonym change method used [5] , [7] is that users simultaneously stop using the LBS for a period of time, and then simultaneously restart to use the LBS with new pseudonyms different from their old pseudonyms. Existing studies [5] - [7] assume that all users participating in pseudonym change have the same anonymity set. However, based on an individual user's belief of the adversary's power against its location privacy (e.g., the adversary's side information about that user), the set of users that it believes can obfuscate its pseudonym (i.e., its anonymity set) can be different from that of another user. Thus motivated, we consider a general anonymity model that can meet users' needs for personalized location privacy, depending on users' physical locations. In particular, each user specifies an anonymity range (a physical area) such that the set of users within the anonymity range constitute that user's potential anonymity set. For example, a user's anonymity range can be a disk centered at the user's location, with a larger radius indicating a lower privacy sensitivity (as illustrated in Fig. 2 ). Note that for two users at different locations, their anonymity ranges are different even when they have the same shape (e.g., two disks with the same radius but different centers), and thus their potential anonymity sets can be different.
Formally, consider a set of users N {1, · · · , N} who have location privacy concerns (e.g., due to having used the same pseudonyms for a certain period of time) and are interested in pseudonym change. Each user i makes a decision a i on whether or not to participate in pseudonym change, denoted by a i = 1 and a i = 0, respectively. Each user i incurs a cost c i > 0 to participate in pseudonym change. This cost can be determined by the user's utility obtained from the LBS. For example, if a user's utility of the LBS is large, then it would have a large cost since it has to stop using the LBS when participating in pseudonym change. The privacy gain perceived by a user participating in pseudonym change depends on those users participating in pseudonym change who form an anonymity set for that user based on their physical locations. Based on the general anonymity model, the physical coupling among users can be captured by a physical graph (N , E P ), where user j is connected by a directed edge e P ji ∈ E P to user i if user j is in user i's potential anonymity set, denoted by N i− (i.e., j ∈ N i− where N i− is the set of users from which user i have incoming edges). Note that the physical coupling between two users can be asymmetric. The privacy gain perceived by a participating user i is defined as its anonymity set size, i.e., the number of participating users in N i− . Since the users in user i's anonymity set can obfuscate user i's identity, a larger anonymity set size means that it is more difficult to distinguish user i from the users in the anonymity set, and thus user i receives a higher privacy gain. Note that the anonymity set size is in an incremental privacy metric based on the idea of k-anonymity, which is widely used to quantify privacy for anonymity-based approaches. For example, in [9] and [7] , a threshold-based privacy metric is used based on k-anonymity, such that a user's location privacy is protected if it cannot be distinguished among k users. Then the individual utility of user i, denoted by u i , is given by
where a −i denotes the vector of the strategies of all users except user i. If a user participates, its individual utility is its privacy gain minus its participation cost; otherwise, it is zero. Note that c i is a relative cost compared to privacy gain.
C. Social Group Utility Maximization (SGUM)
Social relationships play an increasingly important role in people's interactions with each other. One important attribute of social relationship is that people are altruistic to their social "friends" (including friends, family, colleagues, etc.), as they care about their social friends' welfare. As a result, a user would take into account the effect of its behavior on its social friends. Recently, a social group utility maximization framework has been developed in [8] , which captures the impact of mobile users' diverse social ties on the interactions of their mobile devices subject to diverse physical relationships.
Appealing to the SGUM framework [8] , we model the social tie structure among the users in N by a social graph (N , E S ), where user i is connected by a directed edge e S ij ∈ E S to user j if user i has a social tie with user j, denoted by s ij . We assume that each user i's social tie to itself is s ii = 1, and we normalize user i's social tie to user j = i as s ij ∈ (0, 1], which quantifies the extent to which user i cares about user j relative to user i cares about itself. We also assume that s ij = 0 if no social tie exists from user i to user j.
To take into account the social ties among users, each user i aims to maximize its social group utility, defined as
where N i+ denotes the set of users whose potential anonymity sets include user i (i.e., N i+ is the set of users to which user i have outgoing edges in the physical graph). Note that a user's social group utility consists of its own individual utility and the sum of the individual utilities of the other users weighted by social ties. Therefore, the social group utility captures both physical coupling and social coupling among users in a unified way. Also note that a user does not need to know the individual utilities of its social friends (might be their private information) to make the decision (as will be shown in equation (3)).
In Section IV-E, we will discuss how social information can be used while preserving the privacy of users' real identities with respect to each other.
D. SGUM Based Pseudonym Change Game
Based on the SGUM framework, users' socially-aware decision making for pseudonym change boils down to a social group utility maximization game. Specifically, each user i ∈ N is a player and its strategy 3 is a i ∈ {0, 1}. Let a = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) denote the strategy profile consisting of all users' strategies. The payoff function of a user is defined as its social group utility function. Given the strategies of other users, each user i aims to choose the best response strategy that maximizes its social group utility:
Similar in spirit to the Nash equilibrium [23] of a standard non-cooperative game, the following concept applies to the SGUM game.
Definition 1 (Socially-Aware Nash Equilibrium [8] ): A strategy profile a sne = (a
is a socially-aware Nash equilibrium (SNE) for the SA-PCG if no user can improve its social group utility by unilaterally changing its strategy, i.e.,
Due to the rational and autonomous nature of users, an SNE is a stable outcome which is acceptable for all users.
For the sake of system efficiency, a natural objective is to maximize the social welfare of the system, which is the total individual utility of all users denoted by v(a) i∈N u i (a). Definition 2 (Social Optimal [23] ): A strategy profile
is social optimal if it achieves the maximum social welfare among all strategy profiles, i.e.,
Although the social optimal profile is the best outcome in terms of system efficiency, it is often not acceptable for all users. Then, it is desirable to achieve the "best" SNE, i.e., the SNE that achieves the maximum social welfare among all SNEs (referred to as "the best SNE").
Another desirable property for system efficiency is given below.
Definition 3 (Pareto-Optimal [23] ): A strategy profile
is Pareto-optimal if there does not exist a Pareto-superior profile a = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) such that no user achieves a worse individual utility while at least one user achieves a better individual utility, i.e.,
, ∀i ∈ N with at least one strict inequality.
For the SA-PCG, we are interested in answering the following important questions:
• Does the game admit any SNE? If yes, what is the system efficiency of the best SNE? • How can we efficiently find an SNE? What is the system efficiency of this SNE? What are the desirable properties of this SNE if any? To answer these questions, in Section IV we will focus on the analysis of the SA-PCG.
IV. SOCIALLY-AWARE PSEUDONYM CHANGE GAME
We provide a roadmap of the main results in this section as follows. As a benchmark, in Proposition 1, we show that best response updates can find the best NE for the socially-oblivious pseudonym change game (SO-PCG). For the SA-PCG, we first show in Theorem 1 that there always exists an SNE. Then we give a useful property in Lemma 1 that the social group utility is a supermodular function. In Theorem 2, we quantify the system efficiency of SNEs by bounding the performance gap of the best SNE with respect to the optimal social welfare. In contrast to the SO-PCG, we observe that the best response updates may find an SNE with undesirable properties for the SA-PCG. To address this issue, we develop a greedy algorithm that myopically determines users' strategies based on the social group utility derived from only the users whose strategies have already been determined. We first show in Theorem 3 that this algorithm always efficiently finds an SNE. Then we show in Theorem 4 that the SNE found by this algorithm is socially-aware coalition-proof. As a result, we show in Corollary 1 that the SNE is also Pareto-optimal. In Proposition 2, we show that this SNE is monotonically "expanding" when social ties increase, and thus we can show in Corollary 2 that the social welfare of the SNE is no less than that of the best SNE for the SO-PCG. In Theorem 5, we further bound the performance gap of this SNE with respect to the optimal social welfare.
A. Benchmark: Socially-Oblivious Pseudonym Change Game
As a benchmark, we start with a basic case of the PCG: the PCG for socially-oblivious users (SO-PCG), i.e., s ij = 0, ∀i = j. In this case, each user is selfish and its social group utility degenerates to its individual utility.
For the SO-PCG, there can exist multiple SNEs 4 with different values of social welfare. For system efficiency, it is desirable to achieve the best SNE (i.e., the SNE that achieves the maximum social welfare among all SNEs). Let N 1 (a) {i ∈ N |a i = 1} and N 0 (a) {i ∈ N |a i = 0} denote the set of participating users and non-participating users under strategy profile a, respectively. For example, in Fig. 3 , there are three SNEs a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 with N 1 (a 1 ) = {1, 2, 4, 5}, N 1 (a 2 ) = {4, 5}, and N 1 (a 3 ) = ∅, respectively. We can see that a 1 is Pareto-superior to a 2 , a 3 , and hence is the best SNE. To find the best SNE, we can use best response updates as described in Algorithm 1: with all users' actions initially set to 1, each user asynchronously updates (i.e., no two users update at the same time) its action from 1 to 0 if it increases its individual utility. For the example in Fig. 3 , using Algorithm 1, we have line 2: u 6 = 2 − 2.2 < 0 ⇒ line 3: a 6 = 0 ⇒ line 2: u 3 = 0 − 0.5 < 0 ⇒ line 3: 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) . We show that this algorithm always finds the best SNE as follows.
Proposition 1: For the SO-PCG, Algorithm 1 computes the best SNE that achieves the maximum social welfare among all SNEs. 
Proof:
whose action is changed to 0, andā be the profile right before that change. Since a ≤ā, we have
. Therefore a o is Pareto-superior to a . Thus we show that a o is the best SNE. As the best SNE achieves the maximum system efficiency among all SNEs, we will use the best SNE for the SO-PCG as the benchmark for the general case of the PCG: the PCG for socially-aware users (SA-PCG), i.e., ∃i = j such that s ij > 0.
B. Existence and Efficiency of SNEs
In this subsection we study the existence and efficiency of SNEs for the SA-PCG. We first establish the existence of an SNE. Using (1) and (2), we have
It is clear from (3) that no user participating is always an SNE. Then we have the following result. Theorem 1: For the SA-PCG, there exists at least one SNE. Next we show an important property of the social group utility function. It follows from (3) that
Let a ≤ a denote entry-wise inequality (i.e., a i ≤ a i , ∀i ∈ N ). Using (4), we have the following result.
Remark 1: Pseudonym change is an action with network effect such that each participating user benefits more when more users participate. As a result, Lemma 1 shows that a user's social group utility is a supermodular function: the marginal gain of the social group utility by changing the user's action to participating increases when more users participate. This implies that if a user's best response strategy is to participate, then it remains so if more users participate; if a user's best response strategy is to not participate, then it remains the so if less users participate.
To quantify the system efficiency of the SNE, we provide a bound of the gap between the social welfare of the best SNE and the optimal social welfare in the following result.
Theorem 2: The performance gap between the maximum social welfare among all SNEs and the optimal social welfare is upper bounded by i∈N j∈Ni+ (1 − s ij ) .
Proof: We first show that we can construct an SNE from the social optimal profile a * using best response updates: with all users' actions initially set according to the social optimal profile, a user's action is changed from 1 to 0 if that can improve its social group utility. To this end, we first show that this algorithm can terminate. Without loss of generality, we assume that there does not exist a with a > a
where the first equality follows a similar manipulation as in (3) , and the second equality follows from (3). This contradicts the previous assumption. Therefore we must have
Then, according to Lemma 1, the algorithm must terminate and results in a profile a b , which is an SNE and satisfies that a * ≥ a b . Next we show an upper bound on v(a
, letā be the profile right before a i is changed to 0 in the algorithm. Then we have
where the last equality follows from (3), and the first inequality is due to that 0 is the best response strategy. Therefore we have . An example of the SA-PCG shows that the best response updates can find an SNE that is not Pareto-optimal and its social welfare is lower than an SNE for the SO-PCG.
Remark 2: Theorem 2 shows that the performance gap decreases as social ties increase. In particular, when users are socially-oblivious (i.e., s ij = 0, ∀i = j), the performance gap reaches the maximum, and the best SNE for the SA-PCG degenerates to the best SNE for the SO-PCG; when users are fully altruistic (i.e., s ij = 1, ∀i = j), the performance gap becomes 0, and the best SNE degenerates to the social optimal strategy profile. This demonstrates that the (best) SNE spans the continuum between a NE for a standard noncooperative game and the optimal solution for network utility maximization, by monotonically migrating between these two traditionally disjoint paradigms for network optimization.
C. Computing the SNE
In this subsection, we turn our attention to finding an SNE with desirable properties.
For the PCG for fully altruistic users (i.e., s ij = 1, ∀i = j), we can see that the social optimal strategy profile a * is an SNE, and is the solution to the following problem:
Note that problem (5) is an integer quadratic programming, which is in general difficult to solve. 5 Since the PCG for fully altruistic users is a special case of the SA-PCG, it is also difficult to compute the best SNE for the SA-PCG. Based on this observation, our objective below is to efficiently compute an SNE with other desirable properties.
To compute an SNE for the SA-PCG, a plausible approach is to use best response updates in a similar way as Algorithm 1 for the SO-PCG: with all users' actions initially set to 1, each user asynchronously updates its action from 1 to 0 if it increases its social group utility. Using Lemma 1, we can show that such best response updates always converge to an SNE. However, it has drawbacks: the SNE may not be Pareto-optimal and its social welfare may be lower than that of an SNE for the SO-PCG. For example, in Fig. 4 , using the best response updates, we have f 1 (1, 1) − f 1 (0, 1) = 1 − 1.5 + 0.8 > 0, f 2 (1, 1) − f 2 (1, 0) = 1 − 1.5 + 0.8 > 0, and hence a 1 with N 1 (a 1 ) = {1, 2} is an SNE. However, it is not Paretooptimal, since it is Pareto inferior to a 2 with N 1 (a 2 ) = ∅ as u 1 (0, 0) = u 2 (0, 0) = 0 > 1 − 1.5 = u 1 (1, 1) = u 2 (1, 1) . Furthermore, the social welfare of a 1 is less than that of a 2 as v(1, 1) = −1 < 0 = v(0, 0), where a 2 is also an SNE for the SO-PCG. Thus motivated, our objective below is to efficiently find an SNE such that 1) it is Pareto-optimal and 5 We conjecture that problem (5) is an NP-hard problem. 2) its social welfare is no less than that of the best SNE for the SO-PCG, which is the benchmark.
1) Algorithm Design:
To this end, we design an algorithm as described in Algorithm 2. The main idea of the algorithm is to greedily determine users' strategies, depending on the social group utility derived from the users whose strategies have been determined (referred to as "determined users"), denoted by
where N denotes the set of users whose strategies have not been determined (referred to as "undetermined users"). An undetermined user's action is fixed once it becomes determined.
Specifically, the algorithm proceeds in rounds and each round consists of phase I and phase II. In phase I, with all undetermined users' actions initially set to 1, an undetermined user's action is changed from 1 to 0 if it increases its social group utility derived from the determined users, i.e.,
until no such user exists. Then the undetermined users whose actions remain 1 become determined and their actions are fixed to 1. In phase II, with all undetermined users' actions initially set to 0, an undetermined user becomes determined and its action is fixed to 1 if it increases its social group utility derived from the determined users, until no such user exists. The algorithm terminates when no undetermined user becomes determined during either phase I or phase II of a round.
We use an example in Fig. 5 to illustrate how Algorithm 2 works and outline the steps as follows.
• Phase I of 1st round: The number beside a user is its cost; the number beside a social edge is its social tie.
• Phase II of 1st round: Since the size of the set of undetermined users N is upper bounded by N , the computational complexity of phase I and phase II of a round is bounded by O(N 2 ). Since at least one user is determined during a round, the algorithm must terminate within N rounds. Therefore, the running time of the algorithm is bounded by O(N 3 ). In Section V, numerical results will demonstrate that the computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is nearly a quadratic function of the number of users. In Section IV-D, we will propose a distributed version of Algorithm 2.
2) Properties of the SNE: We first show that Algorithm 2 can find an SNE.
Theorem 3: For the SA-PCG, Algorithm 2 computes an SNE.
Proof: We consider three cases of each user i as follows. Case 1: i ∈ N 1 (a e ) and i ∈ N I,k Let a be the profile right after phase I during which i remains in N I . Since a e ≥ a , using (3) we have
where the second inequality is due to the condition in line 5. Case 2: i ∈ N 1 (a e ) and i ∈ N II,k Let a be the profile right after i becomes determined in phase II. Since a e ≥ a , using (3) we have
where the second inequality is due to the condition in line 10.
Case 3: i ∈ N 0 (a e ) Since i is not included in N II in phase II of the last round, using (3) we have
where the inequality is due to the condition in line 10.
As the strategy profile computed by Algorithm 2 is an SNE, it is acceptable for all users. We give another desirable property as follows.
Definition 4 (Socially-Aware Coalition-Proof): A strategy profile a scp = {a
scp n } is socially-aware coalitionproof if no set of users N ⊆ N can change their strategies such that no user i ∈ N or its social friend j ∈ N i+ with s ij > 0 achieves a worse individual utility while at least one of them achieves a better individual utility under the strategy profile a after the change, i.e.,
with at least one strict inequality.
In words, socially-aware coalition-proof states that no group of users can collectively change their strategies to improve the individual utility of at least one of them or their social friends without reducing the individual utility of any of them or their social friends. Next we show that the above property holds for the SNE a e . Theorem 4: For the SA-PCG, the SNE a e is socially-aware coalition-proof.
Proof: Suppose a set of users N ⊆ N change their actions (some users in N may not change their actions but at least one user in N changes its action) and the strategy profile changes from a e to a such that u i (a e ) ≤ u i (a ), ∀i ∈ N , and u j (a e ) ≤ u j (a ), ∀j ∈ {N i+ : s ij > 0}, i ∈ N , with at least one strict inequality. It suffices to show that 1) N 1 (a ) \ N 1 (a e ) = ∅ and 2) N 1 (a e ) \ N 1 (a ) = ∅ so that a e = a . We first show part 1). Suppose N 1 (a ) \ N 1 (a e ) = ∅. We observe that i ∈ N for each i ∈ N 1 (a )\N 1 (a e ). Let i be the first user in N 1 (a ) \ N 1 (a e ) whose action is set to 0 during phase I of the last round, andā be the profile right before a i = 0 is set. Sinceā −i ≥ a −i , we have
where the second inequality follows from thatā ≥ a and the third inequality follows from that i ∈ N . This contradicts the condition in line 5. Next we show part 2). Since we have shown part 1), we must have N 1 (a ) ⊆ N 1 (a e ) (i.e., a ≤ a e ). Suppose N 1 (a e ) \ N 1 (a ) = ∅. According to the assumption, there exists i ∈ N such that u i (a e ) < u i (a ). We consider three cases of i as follows.
Letâ be the profile right before user i becomes determined. Since a
According to the condition in line 5, we have
Therefore, there must exist some j ∈ {N i+ : s ij > 0} such thatâ j = 1. Then we observe that a e j = 1 and j must become determined before i. We consider two cases of j as follows.
In this case, we have
where the first inequality is due to the fact that a e −j ≥ a −j and j ∈ N i+ . This contradicts the assumption that
In this case, we observe that j ∈ N . Letã be the profile right before user j becomes determined. Since j becomes determined before i, we haveã i = 0. Then we have
where the first inequality is due to the fact that a e −j ≥ã −j . Then it follows that
Therefore, there must exist some k ∈ {N j+ : s jk > 0} such thatã k = 1. Similar to the arguments for j, we can consider two cases of k as Case 1.1 or Case 1.2 for j. If Case 1.2 holds, we can recursively apply the arguments until Case 1.1 holds, which leads to a contradiction.
e ≥ a , we have
This contradicts the assumption that u i (a e ) < u i (a ).
which contradicts the assumption that u i (a e ) < u i (a ). Remark 3: Theorem 4 gives a desirable property that is particularly appealing when users are socially-aware. As users are aware of their social ties, some users may have incentive to form a coalition based on their social ties and deviate from the SNE in the hope of improving the individual utilities of them or their social friends. The property of socially-aware coalition-proof eliminates this possibility so that users are willing to accept the SNE as their strategies.
As a special case of Theorem 4, the set of all users N cannot improve the individual utility of at least one of them without reducing that of another by collectively changing their strategies. This leads to the following result.
Corollary 1: For the SA-PCG, the SNE a e is Pareto-optimal.
Next we show that the social welfare of the SNE a e is no less than that of the best SNE for the SO-PCG. To this end, we first show that the SNE a e is monotonically "expanding" with respect to social ties.
Proposition 2: For the SA-PCG, when social ties increase (i.e., s ij ≥ s ij , ∀i = j), the set of participating users at the SNE a e grows (i.e., N 1 (a e ) ⊇ N 1 (a e )) and the social welfare of the SNE a e increases (i.e., v(a e ) ≥ v(a e )). Proof : Let N I,k be the set of users in N I,k during the execution that computes a e . For each i ∈ N I,1 , we have 
for any k, and therefore a e ≤ a e . When a user becomes determined with action 1, the increment of social welfare of determined users by changing its action from 0 to 1 is no less than the increment of its social group utility involving only determined users, which is non-negative. Therefore we can see that v(a e ) ≤ v(a e ). Remark 4: Intuitively, a user with larger social ties with other users is more likely to participate in favor of its social group utility, even at the cost of obtaining a negative individual utility. Proposition 2 confirms that when social ties become larger, more users participate at the SNE. Furthermore, as each additional participating user increases the social welfare, the social welfare of the SNE also increases.
If Algorithm 2 is used for the SO-PCG (i.e., s ij = 0, ∀i = j), we can see that it is equivalent to Algorithm 1 which is used to find the best SNE for the SO-PCG, so that they compute the same strategy profile. Based on this observation, using Theorem 2, we have the following result.
Corollary 2: The social welfare of the SNE a e for the SA-PCG is no less than that of the best SNE for the SO-PCG.
Corollary 2 guarantees that the social welfare of the Pareto-optimal SNE is no less than the benchmark SNE for the SO-PCG. In Section V, numerical results will demonstrate that the Pareto-optimal SNE is efficient, with a performance gain up to 20% over the benchmark.
3) Efficiency of the SNE: Next we investigate the social welfare of the SNE compared to the optimal social welfare.
To this end, we first show that the set of participating users at the SNE a e is a subset of that at the social optimal strategy profile a * . 
Let N I,k be the set of users in N right before phase I of round k andā be the profile right after that phase. Define a a * ∨ā where ∨ denotes entry-wise "or" operation such that N 1 (a ) = N 1 (a * ) ∪ N . Then we have
where the first inequality follows fromā ≤ a , and the last inequality follows from N ⊆ N I,k ⊆ N I,k and the condition in line 5. This contradicts that a * is unique. Similarly, if the first participating user among N 1 (a e ) \ N 1 (a * ) participates in phase II of some round, we can also show a contradiction. Therefore we must have
denote the set of users that participate under the social optimal strategy profile a * but not under the SNE a e . Using Lemma 2, we have the following result.
Theorem 5: The performance gap between the social welfare of the SNE found by Algorithm 2 and the optimal social welfare is upper bounded by i∈NΔ j∈Ni−∩NΔ 1 + i∈NΔ j∈Ni+\NΔ (1 − s ij ). Furthermore, this bound decreases when social ties increase.
Proof: From Lemma 2 we have a * ≥ a e . Then we have
Next we show that the above bound decreases when social ties increase.
where a e is the SNE when social ties increase (i.e., s ij ≥ s ij , ∀i, j ∈ N ). By Theorem 2, we have
Then we have
where the first inequality follows from (6) . This shows the desired result.
Remark 5: Theorem 5 shows that the performance gap decreases when social ties increase. The first part of the performance bound i∈NΔ j∈Ni−∩NΔ 1 is due to the fact that we trade the optimality of the SNE in terms of social welfare (among all SNEs) for computational tractability. As a result, when users are fully altruistic (i.e., s ij = 1, ∀i = j), the second part i∈NΔ j∈Ni+\NΔ (1 − s ij ) becomes 0, while the first part reaches the minimum but can be greater than 0. In Section V, numerical results will demonstrate that the SNE is efficient, with a performance gap less than 5% on average compared to the optimal social welfare.
D. Distributed Computation of the SNE
The SNE computed by Algorithm 2 can be found in a distributed manner. To this end, each user first obtains its potential anonymity set and its social ties with others (will be discussed in Section IV-E). Following Algorithm 2, each user checks if it should change its strategy according to the condition in line 5 or 10 based on other users' strategies, and if yes, announces the change to all users. With time divided into slots, a random backoff mechanism can be used so that at most one user announces a change of strategy in a time slot. If no user announces a change, it indicates the end of phase I or phase II of a round. Therefore, all users keep track of the current state of the algorithm as it proceeds, and thus can act correctly according to the algorithm. The computational complexity of the distributed version of Algorithm 2 is almost the same as the centralized version, and is upper bounded by O(N 3 ). Note that each user only knows the strategies of other users during the execution the algorithm, and thus users' privacy is preserved. After reaching the SNE, the users who decide to change their pseudonyms implement their pseudonym changes.
E. Implementation Issues
If there exists a trusted third party, "trusted" in the sense that it is allowed to know all users' social ties and potential anonymity sets, then it can collect this information from users and find the SNE using Algorithm 2 in a centralized manner. If such a trusted third party does not exist, then users can find the SNE in a distributed manner as described in Section IV-D.
To find the SNE (either in a centralized or distributed manner), each users needs to know its own potential anonymity set and its own social ties with the others. This can be achieved in a privacy-preserving manner using secure protocols as discussed below. We assume that users interested in pseudonym change can communicate with each other.
A user can learn whether another user is within its anonymity range using a certain private proximity detection protocol [13] , [24] . For example, the protocol proposed in [13] can be used if the anonymity range is a disk. Specifically, the protocol involves several message exchanges between the two users, including one message that contains encrypted values that are functions of a user' location or the radius of the anonymity range. The protocol guarantees that both users can only learn the binary result of whether or not one is in another's anonymity range, and neither user can learn the other's location or anonymity range. Similarly, the protocol in [24] can be used if the anonymity range is a convex polygon. Therefore, each user can learn its potential anonymity set without revealing its location information.
A user can also learn its social tie with another user without disclosing one's real identity to the other. To this end, each user keeps a social profile consisting of the social communities that it belongs to (e.g., a community of colleagues at the same workplace), and sets a single social tie level for each community based on its social relationships with those in the community. Each community is identified by a predefined key that is only known to the community's members. Using a certain private matching protocol such as [25] , [26] , two users can learn whether they have a community in common, and if yes, which community 6 it is. In particular, the protocol involves several message exchanges between the two users, including one message that contains encrypted values that are functions of the keys of a user's social communities. The protocol ensures that both users can only know the community they have in common (if it exists), and neither user can learn any additional social information of the other, or pretend to have a community in common with the other. Since a community typically has many members, neither user can know the other's real identity even when they know the community they both belong to. Therefore, each user can learn its social ties with those in its potential anonymity set while keeping their real identities private. Note that although the adversary might collude with multiple users, it is almost infeasible for the adversary to find a sufficient number of colluding users who have social ties with a specific user, in order to infer the user's real identity.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate the performance of the SNE a e for the SA-PCG computed by Algorithm 2. We compare the SNE with two benchmarks: the best SNE a o for the SO-PCG which is computed by Algorithm 1, and the social optimal strategy profile a * , which is the optimal solution of problem (5) and is found by exhaustive search.
A. Simulation Setup
To illustrate the impact of different parameters of the mobile social network on the performance, we consider a synthetic social network as follows. We simulate the social graph G S based on the Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph model [27] , where a social tie exists between any pair of users with probability P S . We assume that the social tie is 1 if it exists. We set N = 10, P S = 0.5 as default values.
To evaluate the performance of the socially-aware pseudonym change in practice, we also consider an empirical social network. Specifically, we generate the social graph according to the real dataset from Brightkite [28] , which is an online social networking service based on mobile phones. To illustrate the social network structure of this dataset, we plot the average number of social tie between a pair of users (in analogy to the probability of social tie in the ER model) versus the number of users in Fig. 10 , and the users' degrees in the social network in Fig. 11 .
We simulate the physical graph based on a practical setting as follows. We consider N mobile users randomly located in a square area with side length 500 m. We assume that the anonymity range of each user is a disk centered at the user's location with radius R. Based on users' physical locations and anonymity ranges, there exists an edge from user i to user j in the physical graph if user i is in the anonymity range of user j. We assume that each user's participation cost follows a normal distribution with mean μ C and variance σ 2 C . We set μ C = 3, σ 2 C = 1 as default values.
B. Simulation Results
1) System Efficiency:
We first evaluate the system efficiency of the SNE for the SA-PCG. To highlight the performance comparison, we normalize the results of the SNE for the SA-PCG and the social optimal solution with respect to the SNE for the SO-PCG. We illustrate the impact of P S , R, μ C , and N on the social welfare for the ER model based social network in Figs. 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively. We observe from Figs. 6-9 that socially-aware users significantly outperform socially-oblivious users, especially when P S or μ C is large, or N is small, or R is moderate. This is because more users participate when they are socially-aware, which improves the social welfare. Fig. 6 shows that the performance of sociallyaware users improves when P S increases, with a performance gain up to 16% over socially-oblivious users and a performance gap less than 10% on average from the optimal social welfare. This is because larger social ties encourage more users to participate. Figs. 8 and 9 show that the performance gap from socially-oblivious users to socially-aware users and the social optimal solution is small when μ C is small or N is large. This is because with a small participation cost, or a large privacy gain of participation due to a large number of users, many users already participate even when they are socially-oblivious. Therefore, the performance gap is small as it depends on the users that participate only when they are socially-aware.
We illustrate the impact of N on the social welfare for the real dataset based social network in Fig. 12 . We observe that the performance gain of socially-aware users can achieve up to 11% over socially-oblivious users, and its performance gap from the optimal social welfare is less than 5% on average. This demonstrates the effectiveness of exploiting social ties for improving location privacy in practice.
2) Computational Complexity: We evaluate the computational complexity of Algorithm 2 for finding the SNE for the SA-PCG. We plot the number of iterations for running Algorithm 2 versus N in Fig. 13 . We observe that the computational complexity increases nearly quadratically as the number of users increases. This shows that the algorithm is scalable for a large number of users.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have studied a socially-aware pseudonym change game for personalized location privacy, based on a general anonymity model with user-specific anonymity sets. The game is based on a social group utility maximization framework that captures mobile users' diverse social ties and diverse physical relationships. For the SA-PCG, we show that there exists a socially-aware Nash equilibrium, and quantify the performance gap of the SNE with respect to the optimal social welfare. Then we develop a greedy algorithm that can efficiently find an SNE that is socially-aware coalition-proof and Pareto-optimal. The SNE also achieves a social welfare larger than the social welfare of any SNE for the sociallyoblivious PCG. We further quantify the performance gap of the SNE with respect to the optimal social welfare is bounded above. Numerical results demonstrate that social welfare can be significantly improved by exploiting users' social ties.
In this paper, we leverage users' positive social ties (between family, friends, etc.) to motivate their altruistic behaviors for pseudonym change so as to improve their location privacy. An interesting direction for future research is to take into account negative social ties (between enemies, opponents, etc.) with which users intend to damage others' welfare.
